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Sovereignty and International Trade Regulation
Gary N. Horlick*
I have to add an historical note. I note that our materials start with
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Certainly from the very beginning
of U.S. history, with the treaty that in effect, created us, the Jay
Treaty, people were bargaining away sovereign economic rights. We
gave away fishing rights to Canada, or as it was then called, Nova
Scotia in return for other English concessions. And no one blinked an
eye that somehow we were sacrificing our sovereignty as part of a deal.
So there has always been a long tradition on the economic sphere of
people just going off and making deals because they made sense, and
not bothering themselves too much with the sovereignty issue. It comes
up all the time, but it has not been a major issue.
One of the interesting aspects is the political heat this issue is now
starting to generate. Just to take a report from April 19, from The
Financial Times, police in India have organized special patrols for 30
U.S. companies in India, including Cargill, Motorola, Hewlett-Packard
and Texas Instruments, because of riots in India over the claim that
the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement infringes Indian sov-
ereignty. So, certainly this is generating some heat as well as light.
The problem as a whole I think is best summarized by Lord Wil-
berforce's rather pithy observation in the English Westinghouse case in
1978, in connection with the traditional (since 1945 in Alcoa) U.S. at-
tempts to extend its sovereignty in antitrust areas, that frequently the
policies being attacked are precisely the ones the host country is deter-
mined to defend. It cannot be put better.
What you get down to frequently - and I will take NAFTA as an
example - are attempts to negotiate those policies. There is a long
tradition of sitting down in the economic sphere and negotiating away
sovereign rights quite freely in both directions, so that everyone is bet-
ter off. It was, for example, perfectly legitimate for the United States
to want in NAFTA to add labor, environment, whatever else it wanted.
This was not being forced on Mexico or Canada, it was part of a bar-
gaining proposition. If someone wants to bargain for something, well
then there is a price. It would be quite different if you were trying to
impose it. And obviously there is international legal doctrine on when
negotiation becomes coercion, but I doubt anyone could seriously claim
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that NAFTA reached that point.
Before I get into NAFTA directly, I will have to take head on
Jon's assertion that the difference between the European Union (EU)
and NAFTA is a difference of form over substance, or, as he put it in
another context, a difference of degree rather than kind. If that is true,
the difference of degree is so huge as to become a difference in kind,
and a rather major one. I will pick on some of his examples which will
show that NAFTA in essence comes half way in doing what the EU
does. Take rules of origin, the laudable fact that you can get a binding
ruling under NAFTA from any of the customs agencies in the three
countries. What he did not tell you is that it is not binding on the other
two agencies, and there is no guarantee of the binding ruling you get.
With luck, NAFTA will be more cooperative than the U.S./Ca-
nada FTA was, but the 49th parallel is littered with the bodies (or
trucks) of innocent merchants who thought that a binding ruling from
Canada on the rule of origin would be effective with U.S. Customs, or
vice versa. There is progress, and I want to focus on the positive side,
because you can negotiate progress.
We now in NAFTA have a single customs origin form for
NAFTA, whereas in the U.S./Canada FTA, each country had a differ-
ent form. But you are a long way from Europe. What is the rule of
origin within Europe? In practical terms, there is no one at the border
checking. So this is a difference of degree, I will concede, but a differ-
ence of degree that if you happen to be driving a truck, is so great as to
be a difference in kind.
Jon correctly quoted Canadian law on the subject of deference to
NAFTA. He did not quote U.S. law, which in typical U.S. fashion says
that the U.S. law takes precedence over the international rules. The
U.S. statute does not mention the traditional U.S. rule from the
Charming Betsy in 1804, a John Marshall opinion that the U.S. shall
always try to interpret its laws to the maximum extent possible to be in
conformity with its international obligation. This is a black letter rule
which is usually ignored now by U.S. courts, and which the Justice
Department no longer appears in court to advocate very often.
Turning to NAFTA, as I said, NAFTA is in my view "half-way"
for good reason. Fortunately, among the U.S., Canada and Mexico, we
have not gone out and killed 60 million of each other in this century.
Consequently you do not have the same political drive that you had in
Europe, certainly in the '60's and later, to have a more integrated unit.
That difference in the politics obviously lies behind the difference in the
structures. That said, NAFTA is an attempt to manage economic in-
terdependence without a great deal of concern for sovereignty. I am not
going to recite the article which I put in the materials, which you can
all read at your leisure. The core of it, as Jon pointed out, is the Chap-
ter 20 dispute resolution system.
[Vol. 20:57 1994
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I. CHAPTER 20 OF NAFTA AND VOTING RIGHTS
What I want to focus on here is the issue of voting rights. In the
end you have to focus on who decides and in political science terms
what you are talking about is legitimacy.
A Spanish fisherman is perfectly accustomed to a bureaucrat in
Brussels, probably Greek, telling him what kind of net he can use. I do
not want to pick on France, but if he is French, he might even block
the entry of fish. The fisherman is not happy about it, but it is consid-
ered legitimate. And one of the reasons it is considered legitimate is
that Spain has X votes in the EU out of the total of Y votes on the EU
regulation that tells you what size net you can use. By contrast, New
England fishermen, or some Canadian fishermen, do not recognize the
legitimacy of someone in Washington, in the U.S. case, or Ottawa, in
the Canadian case, telling them what size net to use. Compliance with
fishing laws, especially in the U.S., has been more noted for its absence
than its presence, leading to a noted absence of fish. So, what you are
dealing with in essence is some sort of perceived legitimacy.
The closest we come in NAFTA - and that is why I focus on it
as interesting - is precisely the reverse selection that Jon mentioned.
Let us assume for the moment that you tried to form a European
Community out of Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. You could
not. Germany would never accept one-country, one-vote. Belgium and
the Netherlands would never accept weighted voting. You have to have
France.
Well, put in a NAFTA context, you cannot have one-country, one-
vote on issues that really matter, and you cannot have weighted voting.
In fact if you look into the future, you have to include Brazil in order
to get anywhere near the kind of proportions of population, without
even getting into size of the economies. So the problem in Chapter 20
becomes how you vote.
The U.S. has a nearly paranoid fear, understandable in political
terms, that Jon and Chris Thomas lived through, of being ganged up
on. So you could not have a situation in NAFTA, for example, of a
panel of seven, where everyone gets two members, and you flip for the
chairman. The U.S. fantasy is that even if the U.S. chooses the chair-
man, we would always be ganged up on, four to three.
The reverse selection Jon describes is done not for its elegance and
as a neat solution, for which I credit the negotiators, but rather because
it means that for the U.S. to lose a Chapter 20 decision in NAFTA, it
has to lose either on the basis of votes by U.S. citizens the other coun-
tries chose, or votes by other countries' citizens the U.S. chose; there-
fore, the U.S. is not ganged up on by the other countries.
It is a beautiful solution, until NAFTA gets beyond three or four
countries. Indeed if there is an extension of NAFTA, you start talking
about weighted voting, at which point Mexico and Canada weigh in
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and say they get the right in any such extension to the same number of
votes as the U.S. has, because they had it in the beginning.
Now, contrast that with the European Union, which just went
through a major battle over the exact same issue. The expansion to
include the three Scandinavian countries plus Austria meant an expan-
sion in the number of votes - you obviously do not take votes away
from existing members - and a big fight over what is a blocking mi-
nority in the EU terms ensued.
To me the contrast with Europe is that there, one had an open
attempt to negotiate sovereignty and voting, and here, for political rea-
sons we cannot do that. Neither the U.S., Canada nor Mexico is even
willing to talk publicly about yielding sovereignty and voting rights and
all of that.
So the Chapter 20 solution is a neat solution to managing interde-
pendence, i.e. to giving up something in economic and increasingly
other fields, without having to confront the voting issue head on. What
I just said is hardly a criticism of the NAFTA negotiators; it is reality.
You would not have a NAFTA if you started talking about weighted
voting.
II. LABOR AND ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
The main debate about NAFTA in terms of sovereignty was over
the labor and environmental side agreements. Now this is interesting,
because the agreements by their terms make no change at all in the
labor and environmental laws of any of the three countries. The discus-
sion was explicitly limited to ensuring that each country enforces its
own laws. Obviously you have a sovereign right to decide if you are
enforcing your own laws, and what was being talked about was "giving
that up." But you were not talking about changes in either who en-
forces the laws or what the laws were. Again, contrast this with the
European Union, where international bureaucrats in Brussels make the
rules, and often ensure enforcement. The interesting part of the labor
and environmental agreement in Canada is that the issue was whether
you impose trade sanctions or not. The U.S. and Mexico accepted trade
sanctions.
Trade sanctions fit Jon's formula, which is that you are not giving
up your sovereignty; what you are doing is in effect saying "I can reject
what this international process decides, if I am willing to pay a price in
trade sanctions by retaliation against my own goods." So the accept-
ance of trade sanctions is a maintenance of sovereignty; it is "I am
willing to pay a price to stay sovereign."
Canada's solution shows how "snake bit" Canada feels about U.S.
trade measures. Canada agreed that Canadian courts can enforce the
decisions. In effect Canada gives up its sovereignty. They give it up to
Canadian courts, but they are saying a Canadian court will implement
[Vol. 20:57 1994
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the decisions of this three nation body, whereas U.S. and Mexico say
"no, we will decide whether we accept it or not, and if we do not, we
are willing to pay for it."
Buried within the side agreements, very strikingly - and it is a
tribute to what politicians will do when negotiations are almost finished
and they have to close the deal - at several points in the labor and
environmental panel process, decisions are made based on the majority,
vote, and the U.S. has only one vote, which I consider amazing; and no -
one in Congress batted an eye because we were viewed as pushing the
Mexicans into these side agreements.
Now obviously, as I mentioned, we cannot keep agreeing to one-,
country, one-vote. If you get into a western hemisphere free trade area,'-
we are one country out of - depending on how you count them - 30
or more countries. So it is called the OAS and it is not traditionally the
favorite model of the United States. So keep an eye on that issue, be-
cause the extension of NAFTA forces you to go back to the voting
mechanism, because of the U.S. fear of being outvoted.
III. CHAPTER 11 PRIVATE INVESTOR REMEDIES
The most interesting part of NAFTA as a concession of sover-
eignty, in my view, is the Chapter 11 investor-state dispute resolution
system to which Jon alluded. This also to me is the biggest invitation to
lawyers' creativity. One purpose of Chapter 11 is Mexico giving up
what many of you are familiar with, its Calvo Clause. Under the Calvo
Clause, to grossly over generalize, an investor has to sue in the courts
of the host country. It cannot go outside. In effect the investor is waiv-
ing its rights to sue outside of the country.
NAFTA gets rid of the Calvo Clause. Instead of going to Mexican
courts, if Mexico (or the U.S.) discriminates against a NAFTA inves-
tor, the investor can go to arbitration. Bear in mind, for anyone who
has any complaints against any of the three countries, you do not have
to be a U.S. or Canadian national. A NAFTA investor is someone with
a significant business presence, more than just a shell in the U.S., Ca-
nada or Mexico. So Sony U.S. can complain that some Mexican gov-
ernment unit is discriminating against Sony, and Sony U.S. can use
this procedure.
Now there are some safeguards, but they are weak, in my view,
though maybe the three governments have "nods and winks" about
them. In essence, you can take a sovereign country to arbitration, the
arbitrators give you a money award, and you can go collect it. This
applies to state and local governments as well as the national
governments.
So if Lake County, Ohio denies you, Sony U.S., your zoning vari-
ance and you claim that there is some discrimination - that Lake
County would grant the variance for an "American company," Sony
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Mexicana or Sony Canada can trigger one of these panels. And God
knows what will happen when the Lake County Board of Supervisors,
or whatever local governing body, gets an order from a U.S. District
Court, under the New York Convention, ordering it to pay. That is the
process to which the U.S. has agreed.
Now, of course the U.S. only agreed to this because it "knew"
perfectly well, as trade negotiators always "know," that in practice,
Chapter 11 would apply only to Mexico. Actually, I think this stands
more for' the proposition, which is a scary one, that trade negotiators
almost invariably know more about the foreign country than their own
domestic arrangements. Thus, the U.S. negotiators could tell you, in
considerable detail, how bad the Mexican judicial system is. But if you
ask them, as I once asked one of them, what the average time to get to
a jury in a civil action in the District of Columbia is, the reply is
"huh?" Four years was the answer, by the way. And this is when they
were complaining about Mexican courts taking too long.
Trade negotiators typically do not know their own domestic ar-
rangement. It is not because they are ignorant, rather it is because they
spend all of their time studying the foreign countries. For the corporate
people here, that is probably the most important lesson to bear in mind,
in view of the prospect of international negotiations on labor law or
environmental law. Your own country's negotiators will be perfectly
willing to advocate things that would be a nightmare back home, not
because they are trying to change their law, but because they do not
know it. By "do not know it," I do not mean that they cannot look it up
and they are not smart people, but as all of you know, if there are any
labor lawyers here, you have to know the entire culture, the ethos, how
the rules fit together, what the real meaning of the precedents are,
etc. . . . Well, you know you are not going to have many labor lawyers
doing that negotiation; certainly not private ones, and certainly not
management ones under this Administration. So hold on to your
wallets.
What lies ahead for the future? To me the most interesting indica-
tor is the one Jon highlighted, which is the new WTO Subsidies Agree-
ment. It is as he described, a stealth version. It was not a controversial
negotiation. It was probably, as I think about it, the best of the negoti-
ations, or one of the best. It was essentially negotiated by the U.S.,
Europe, Canada and the GATT secretariat, with Mexico later joining
in, all on a very cooperative basis. There were grave disagreements, but
everyone was trying to find "the right answer." And the result is a
significant possibility of international discipline on subsidies at every
level of government, all the way down to - I will pick on Lake County
again - Lake County.
Let me change the tune. You just saw that Mercedes Benz went to
Alabama a few months ago. It was going to go to North Carolina, and
[Vol. 20:57 1994
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overnight switched to Alabama. As the deal started dribbling out, the
total came to $253 million in state aid. And the plant only cost $300
million. And then the final shoe fell. To show you how inventive people
can get in subsidizing, it turned out the subsidy was $300 million; the
difference was made up by an agreement by the state of Alabama to
buy 7,500 Mercedes Benz vehicles for state officials. So, you are going
to see a lot of Mercedes driving around in Alabama with government
tags.
Imagine someone telling Alabama, when it was in the process of
stealing this plant from North Carolina, or Ontario or wherever, "you
cannot do that." Well, what you are looking at is some fantasy of world
government. A bunch of pointy headed international bureaucrats in
Geneva - to use the pejorative term that is frequently used - will be
sitting there deciding what Lake County, Ohio, or Manitoba, or Ja-
lisco, can do. And no one is even aware of that. At the same time, in
the same building, according to the paranoid fantasy, a similar group
of bureaucrats will be pointing out how to subvert our environmental
laws or our labor laws. The reality, as any of you who has been to
Geneva knows, is considerably less colorful, not to mention slower.
But if you look at these new WTO agreements - Subsidies,
TRIPS, Agriculture, Phytosanitary, Technical Standards - these are
not dealing with border measures. They are dealing with uniform rules
applied domestically; uniform domestic rules. They are not about tar-
iffs, anti-dumping, customs valuation; they are about normal domestic
law.
The environmental push on NAFTA and GATT, if you will recall,
did not begin under President Clinton. It began when you had a Re-
publican President viewed as being anti-environment. The U.S. envi-
ronmental groups and labor groups were well aware that what they
were trying to do was get leverage on their own government.
Let me go back to the NAFTA labor process. The side agreement
is limited, as I said, to enforcement of each country's own laws, and
only certain of them. The labor rights, again to over generalize, cover
worker safety and treatment of workers, but not the right to organize.
The first two complaints have already been filed and initiated two
days ago against Honeywell and General Electric. You have read the
complaints. The people drafting them, being lawyers, knew enough to
put in that they are complaining about worker safety, but 90% of the
complaints are about the right to organize, which is explicitly excluded
by the agreement. Once you start pushing the right to organize in Mex-
ico, what about the U.S. right to work laws? That is clearly where this
is headed. So right now everyone with an axe to grind domestically is
starting to figure out, "how can I ride on the next trade agreement?"
Where does that leave us? You have in the WTO and in NAFTA
something that formally meets Jon's definition, in the sense that, one,
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they both have clauses that you terminate; and secondly, probably more
importantly, you can ignore the rules. With the exception of Canada on
the labor and environmental side agreements, you can ignore the rules
and nothing happens domestically. You suffer retaliation in the trade
sense, but there is no domestic effect at all. Now, realistically, does
anyone think the U.S. can pull out of WTO or NAFTA?
So, what you are left with is - and this is what U.S. Trade Rep-
resentation is telling Congress as we speak - that we can always ig-
nore the decisions. Well, that is easy to say, but what if the WTO or
NAFTA panel decides that our subsidy is illegal, that you could not
give the money to Mercedes Benz? Well, we will just stiff them, be-
cause we do not have to listen to them, because all you are talking
about is Alabama.
The other side of the equation, however, in reality becomes that if
we stiff them we will have to allow them to shut out exports from
North Dakota. North Dakota has just as many senators as Alabama.
So when it really happens, you are going to have two senators from
North Dakota saying "Oh, no, you are going to pay attention to that
panel."
Finally, let me turn to the most interesting frontier for "loss of
sovereignty in the trade area" and this is what is being done informally,
and Jon referred to some of it. Let me direct your attention to two
examples. In the one Jon mentioned about having rules of origin, the
NAFTA countries agreed formally to have the same rules of origin.
They then sat down, each of them, and they negotiated the rules to-
gether. Each of them went off and promulgated technically three sepa-
rate rules. There is a U.S. rule of origin, which by coincidence is identi-
cal to the Mexican and the Canadian rules of origin. But this is
happening in much less formal ways all over the world.
There is an excellent study by the Administrative Conference of
the United States of regulation of safety of large aircraft. Well, intui-
tively you know that you better have the same safety rules applying to
aircraft at both ends of the flight if it is international. The people at the
FAA who do aircraft safety go and meet with the joint European regu-
lators, which is not a formal body; it is an informal body in Europe.
And they all sit down and hash out the issues and they all go home and
write regulations, which are not identical, but are pretty identical, and,
more importantly, do not conflict. So the airplane can fly between both
places. Aircraft safety, or fundamental domestic government responsi-
bility, is now being done internationally, with no one looking at it.
Let me take the more extreme example, to which Jon adverted:
the Basel Agreement on capital requirements. All of a sudden people
all over New England were finding out that they could not get loans.
Why? Because banks had to have a minimum capital requirement
agreed at Basel. Who said that? Not some locally elected group, or
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even the Federal Reserve. But the Federal Reserve, a completely
unelected body, had gone off and met with the other central bankers,
none of whom were elected, in Basel - it is always in Switzerland for
some reason - and agreed on what the capital requirements should be.
The result, arguably, was a credit crunch all over the world. Now
you cannot get much more fundamentally "domestic" than the availa-
bility of credit in an economic system. Here it is being decided interna-
tionally by a group of people, none of whom faced a vote and certainly
with no fast track authority, no debate, in fact, no public access.
So, when you look into the future, the question is not whether
there will be more of this international "cessation of sovereignty,"
rather the question is "how."
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